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Abstract 
When someone expresses prejudice against an outgroup, how negatively do we judge the 
prejudiced individual and his or her ingroup? Previous lines of research suggest that the 
answer depends on the ingroup’s entitativity––i.e., how cohesive it is––but they make 
different predictions about whether entitativity should increase or decrease outside observers’ 
negative reactions to prejudice. We resolve this tension by demonstrating divergent 
consequences of entitativity for prejudiced individuals versus their groups. Mediational and 
experimental data from six studies (two pre-registered; N = 2,455) support two hypotheses: 
Entitativity increases how responsible the group seems for its member’s prejudice, which in 
turn decreases how unacceptable observers find the member’s behavior and how much they 
condemn her (H1), but which also increases how much they condemn the group (H2). Thus, 
entitativity can grant individuals a license to express prejudice but can damage their group’s 
reputation. 
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Group Cohesion Benefits Individuals Who Express Prejudice, But Harms Their Group 
In May of 2018, actress Rosanne Barr, a vocal Trump supporter, publicly compared 
Valerie Jarrett, a former Obama advisor, to an ape. Given that Jarrett is African American, 
the comment was widely labelled as racist. In the ensuing social media storm, commentators 
argued about how much condemnation Barr deserved, and how much to blame other Trump 
supporters who were not involved in the incident (Chow, 2018; Flood, 2018). 
When an individual expresses prejudice, how harshly do observers judge the 
individual and the group to which he or she belongs? Research on intergroup relations 
suggests that the answer depends on how much of a cohesive, unified entity these observers 
believe the individual’s ingroup is—that is, how entitative it seems (Campbell, 1958; 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). However, it is unclear exactly what effect these entitativity 
perceptions will have. One line of research suggests that group entitativity invites censure 
from outsiders when some group members commit transgressions (see Lickel, Hamilton, & 
Sherman, 2001). Another line of research suggests that group entitativity reduces censure 
when group members express prejudice (Effron & Knowles, 2015). The present research 
seeks to resolve this tension, and does so by offering a new perspective on when and how 
entitativity benefits versus harms groups and their members (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003; 
Dang, Liu, Ren, & Gu, in press; Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999; Newheiser, Sawaoka, & 
Dovidio, 2012; Newheiser & Dovidio, 2015). We begin by outlining the two existing 
perspectives in more depth. 
Entitativity Invites More Negative Reactions to Prejudice 
There is reason to believe that entitativity will invite censure when a member of a 
group expresses anti-outgroup prejudice. Groups that appear more entitative are held more 
collectively responsible when a subset of members transgresses (e.g., Lickel & Onuki, 2015; 
Waytz & Young, 2012). In other words, the group is assumed to have caused or allowed the 
transgression directly or indirectly (Lickel et al., 2001), in part because observers think 
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members of entitative groups readily influence each other’s behavior (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, 
Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006). For example, the more cohesive people viewed a high school 
clique as being, the more responsible they held it for a school shooting committed by two of 
its members (Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003). Extrapolating from existing research, it 
seems likely that more-entitative groups would be held more responsible for prejudice 
expressed by an individual member. Being held responsible for prejudice could damage the 
group’s reputation and even invite retribution against the group (Gaertner, Iuzzini, & 
O’Mara, 2008; Sjöstström & Gollwitzer, 2015; Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). 
So according to this perspective, when a group member expresses prejudice, entitativity 
invites more negative reactions from observers outside the group. 
Entitativity Invites Less Negative Reactions to Prejudice 
In contrast to the collective-responsibility perspective, there is also evidence that a 
group’s entitativity can reduce censure when a group member expresses prejudice by 
providing a license for the prejudice. The term license describes the degree of legitimacy 
someone has to do or say something that would otherwise be discrediting (Miller & Effron, 
2010). The more license people have, the less unacceptable their behavior seems to the 
broader community (Effron & Knowles, 2015), and the less moral condemnation they receive 
(Effron & Monin, 2010). Prejudice rarely receives a complete pass (Fiske, 1998), but some 
people are afforded greater license for prejudice than others (Effron & Monin, 2010; 
Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002; Thai, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2016). Suggesting that the 
appearance of group entitativity can license prejudice, participants estimated that their peers 
would find the same acts of racial, national, and religious bias less unacceptable when 
committed by members of more-entitative versus less-entitative outgroups (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015). The authors argued that observers tend to attribute prejudice in an entitative 
group to a “rationalistic” desire to defend or advance group interests rather than to irrational 
hatred, because entitative groups have better-defined collective interests than less-entitative 
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groups. Because this prejudice seems rationalistically motivated, observers judge it to be less 
socially unacceptable. So according to this perspective, when a group member expresses 
prejudice, entitativity invites less negative reactions from observers outside the group. 
Resolving the Tension 
Judgments of Prejudiced Individuals Versus Their Group 
Two different streams of work in the intergroup relations literature—one on collective 
responsibility, and the other on prejudice licensing—appear to make conflicting predictions 
about how negatively outside observers will respond to expressions of prejudice from more- 
versus less-entitative groups. Resolving this tension, we propose, requires distinguishing 
judgments of the specific member observed expressing prejudice from those of the group to 
which he or she belongs. The work on collective responsibility measures how people judge 
groups as a function of their entitativity when a member transgresses, but does not assess 
judgments of the transgressing member him or herself (e.g., Lickel et al., 2003). By contrast, 
the work on prejudice licensing measures how people judge an individual for expressing 
prejudice as a function of whether he or she belongs to an entitative group, but does not 
assess how people judge the individual’s group as a whole (Effron & Knowles, 2015). 
We suggest that entitativity will have different effects on an individual observed 
expressing prejudice versus the rest of his or her group. Consistent with the prejudice-
licensing work, we argue that group entitativity makes an individual’s prejudice seem more 
socially acceptable and less deserving of condemnation to outside observers. Simultaneously, 
consistent with the collective-responsibility work, group entitativity makes the group as a 
whole seem more responsible for an individual member’s prejudice. Thus, when a group 
member expresses prejudice, entitativity may help get that member off the hook while putting 
the rest of the group on the hook. 
How Collective Responsibility Benefits the Prejudiced Individual 
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Further integrating and extending the collective-responsibility and prejudice-licensing 
perspectives, we argue that entitativity grants individuals a prejudice license precisely 
because entitativity makes the group seem more responsible for the individual’s behavior. In 
other words, we propose collective responsibility as a novel mechanism explaining why 
entitativity licenses individuals’ prejudice. 
There are two reasons to expect that people afford greater license to a prejudiced 
individual when they hold his or her group collective responsible. First, the prejudiced 
individual may seem less responsible in light of others’ responsibility. This diffusion of 
responsibility from individual to group (cf. Darley & Latané, 1968; Mynatt & Sherman, 
1975) would make the individual’s behavior seem less unacceptable because people are 
judged less harshly when they bear less responsibility for wrongdoing (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 
1995). Second, collective responsibility may seem to justify the prejudice by implying other 
group members feel the same way. Expressing prejudice may seem less problematic when 
“everyone is doing it,” even if the individual is still viewed as causally responsible for 
expressing those views (cf. Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). Both these reasons point to our central 
claim: that outside observers hold highly entitative groups more responsible than less-
entitative groups for an individual member’s prejudice, and that these collective 
responsibility judgments make the individual’s behavior seem more socially acceptable and 
less deserving of condemnation. Stated formally, we hypothesize the following indirect 
effect: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Group entitativity increases how collectively responsible the 
group is held for individual members’ prejudice, which in turn increases the license 
afforded to these specific individuals. 
 
The process through which collective responsibility licenses individuals’ prejudicial 
acts is conceptually distinct from the collective-interest mechanism identified in previous 
research (Effron & Knowles, 2015). The collective-interest mechanism involves judgments 
about an individual’s reasons for acting (Malle, Knobe, O'Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 
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2000)––whether he or she thinks expressing prejudice will advance or protect the group’s 
interests. In contrast, the collective-responsibility mechanism involves judgments concerning 
the group’s causal relationship to the act––whether the group caused or allowed the 
expression of prejudice (Lickel et al., 2001; Lickel & Onuki, 2015). Conceptually, collective 
interests can motivate prejudice without the group bearing any responsibility. For example, a 
White American could refuse to shop at stores owned by Asian Americans, despite the 
protests of his White friends, because he thinks Asians are putting White-owned stores out of 
business. Conversely, a group could bear responsibility for prejudice that is motivated by 
concerns other than collective interests. The White American could refuse to patronize Asian-
owned stores, not because he thinks this will help Whites, but because his White friends 
convinced him all Asian stores sell poor-quality goods.  
How Collective Responsibility Harms the Individual’s Group 
We have argued that the collective responsibility pinned on entitative groups benefits 
the individual expressing prejudice. However, it may also harm the rest of the individual’s 
group. People often condemn and punish those they hold responsible for a wrongdoing 
(Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006; Weiner, 1995). By increasing how 
responsible the group seems, entitativity could therefore increase how much observers 
condemn the group for a member’s prejudice.  
In this sense, entitativity may deprive groups of collective license for an individual 
member’s prejudice, even as it grants the individual herself a license. Whereas individual 
license lets people off the hook for their own actions (Effron & Monin, 2010), collective 
license––a term we introduce here––lets groups off the hook for a member’s actions. Like 
collective responsibility, collective license is a judgment about how an individual’s behavior 
reflects on the rest of his or her group. But whereas collective responsibility is about 
causation (i.e., did the group directly or indirectly bring about the individual’s behavior?; 
Lickel et al., 2001), collective license is about moral culpability (i.e., should the group be 
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morally condemned for the individual’s behavior?). To further investigate our claim that the 
appearance of entitativity benefits an individual who expresses prejudice while harming his 
or her group, we tested whether entitativity increases the degree of license afforded to the 
prejudiced individual while reducing the license afforded to his or her group.  
Our secondary hypothesis is thus an indirect effect in the opposite direction as H1: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Group entitativity increases how collectively responsible the 
group is held for individual members’ prejudice, which in turn decreases the license 
afforded to the group. 
 
Research Overview  
We tested our primary hypothesis (H1) in a pilot study, four experiments and a 
follow-up study in which participants considered expressions of prejudice by members of 
various groups. The pilot––in which participants judged prejudice by members of real 
religious groups––sought correlational evidence for the proposed relationship between 
entitativity, collective responsibility, and individual license. Experiment 1 sought causal 
evidence for this relationship by manipulating entitativity perceptions. Experiment 2 aimed to 
replicate Experiment 1’s findings, empirically distinguish between collective responsibility 
and collective interests as separate mechanisms, and explore how people judged the 
prejudiced individual’s responsibility. Experiment 3 manipulated collective responsibility to 
assess its causal role as a mechanism and to test a theoretically relevant boundary condition. 
Finally, Experiment 4 tested whether the effect predicted by H1 was robust to using a 
different measure of license, and tested our secondary hypothesis, H2: whether entitativity 
could reduce the degree of license afforded to the group as a whole for a single member’s 
prejudice despite increasing the degree of license afforded to that member.1 
                                               
1 Our theorizing does not suggest hypotheses about whether entitativity has different effects 
on the license afforded to one individual who expresses prejudice versus a group of 
individuals who all express prejudice (see Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998), but we 
explored this issue in Experiment 2 and discuss it in the General Discussion.   
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The studies report all measures, conditions, and participant exclusions, and explain 
how sample sizes were determined (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). Experiments 3 
and 4 were pre-registered. The Online Supplement reports supplemental analyses for 
Experiment 3 (Appendix 1), a Follow-Up Study that tests Experiment 3’s generalizability 
(Appendix 2), verbatim study materials (Appendices 3–8), and pre-registration documents 
(Appendices 9 and 10). 
Pilot Study 
This initial study sought correlational evidence in support of H1. 
Method 
Participants. Informed by previous work (Effron & Knowles, 2015) , we aimed to 
recruit 250 participants. A sensitivity analysis shows that this sample size provides 80% 
power at a = .05 to detect a small correlation, r = .124 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007), and an a priori power analysis, conducted with a Monte Carlo simulation 
(Schoemann, Boulton, & Short, 2017), shows that the sample provides more than 88% power 
to detect the hypothesized indirect effect (H1) assuming modest correlations among all 
variables, r = .25, and SDs = 1 (computed with 1,000 resamples and 20,000 Monte Carlo 
draws).2  
We invited local residents and students enrolled in a lab subject pool in London, 
England, to complete this online study for £2. They could only begin if they correctly 
answered a reading comprehension question and were not using a mobile device to access the 
study. Of the 255 who began, 237 remained after applying a priori exclusions (i.e., duplicate 
IP address or participant ID; failed attention check [see below]). Participants represented 47 
nationalities and multiple religions (60 Christians, 42 Atheists, 35 Agnostics, 21 Hindus, 14 
Muslims, 9 Buddhists, 7 Jews, 28 who selected multiple religions, and 21 who selected 
                                               
2 Schoemann et al.’s methods produce power calculations for fully between-subjects designs. 
Because the Pilot Study has a repeated measures component, its power exceeds 88%. 
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“other”).  
Materials. Each participant considered two of the following three groups: Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims. For each group, they completed the following measures. 
Independent variable: entitativity. Participants completed a six-item entitativity 
measure (Denson et al., 2006): how much group members share knowledge, have common 
goals, have strong interpersonal bonds, have shared norms, can influence each other, and 
interact with each other (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much so; as > .81 for the two groups rated). 
Mediator: collective responsibility. Participants assigned responsibility for each of 
seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors committed by a member of each group (e.g., a 
Christian who avoids shopping at stores owned by members of other religious groups; 0 = the 
individual is completely responsible; 100 = other members of the group are completely 
responsible; averaged across the seven behaviors, as > .87). (For a complete list of the 
prejudiced preference and behaviors, see Online Supplement, Appendix 3, and Effron & 
Knowles, 2015). 
Dependent variable: license. As in previous work (Effron & Knowles, 2015), we 
measured license by asking participants how acceptable it would be, according to the average 
participant in the study, for a member of each group to commit each of the seven prejudiced 
behaviors (as > .87; Not at all, Slightly, Somewhat, Mostly, and Entirely coded 1-5). This 
operationalization follows from the idea of license as perceived social acceptability, a belief 
about how much one’s peers would condone the prejudice (see Miller & Effron, 2010).  
Estimating the average participant’s attitudes also avoids potential floor effects due to 
participants’ reluctance to be seen as personally condoning prejudice.  
Control variables. As robustness checks, we measured and controlled for several 
variables that could covary with entitativity perceptions: a three-item measure of the 
perceived prevalence of prejudice against the group (e.g., “how common is it for people to be 
prejudiced against” the relevant group; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so; as > .75; Effron & 
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Knowles, 2015); how warmly participants themselves felt towards the relevant group, and 
how warmly they thought the average participant in the study felt, rated on feelings 
thermometers from 0 = Cold to 100 = Warm with 50 = Neutral (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & 
Fiske, 1982; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006); a measure of perceived group size (“what 
percentage of people in Europe do you think identify as” members of the group?); the 
specific religious group rated (dummy-coded), and a 3-item measure of participants’ 
religiosity adapted from survey research (“how religious do you consider yourself to be?” 1 = 
Not at all, 4 = Very religious; “how often do you attend religious services?” 1= Never, 9 = 
Several times per week; and “how often do you pray?” 1 = Never, 9 = Several times per day; 
each item standardized before averaging; a = .88) 
Attention check. Participants read a short paragraph that ended with the instruction to 
select an option labeled “other” and write the word “group” in the blank. As noted, 
participants who failed to follow directions were excluded (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009).  
Procedure. We first assessed the independent and control variables for each group, 
and then did the same for the second group. Then we assessed the mediator for each group, 
and the dependent variable for each group. 
Results 
Hypothesis test. We analyzed the data in a multilevel mediation model with random 
intercepts for participants because each participant rated two groups.3 Supporting H1, higher 
entitativity perceptions predicted greater collective responsibility attributions, which in turn 
predicted individual license – a significant indirect effect b = .02, z = 2.93, p = .003 (see 
Figure 1). These results remained robust when we added the control variables, b = .02, z = 
                                               
3 In Stata 13, we used the gsem command to run the multilevel model with latent variables 
specifying random intercepts for participants, and the nlcom command to compute the 
indirect effect by multiplying the a and b paths together. 
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2.18, p = .029.4 Examining the total effect of entitativity on license (i.e., without specifying a 
mediated pathway) showed higher entitativity was significantly associated with greater 
license overall, b = .07, z = 2.17, p = .030 without controls, and b = .09, z = 2.42, p = .016 
with controls.  
Exploratory analyses. We explored whether the relationships between entitativity, 
collective responsibility, and license were moderated by whether participants were members 
of the specific religious group rated (dummy-coded). Neither moderation effect was 
significant in a mixed model with random intercepts for participants, b = 1.06, z = .67, p = 
.505 and b = .10, z = 1.15, p = .251, respectively. We urge caution in interpreting these null 
effects, however, because participants rated their religious ingroups for only 70 out of 474 
observations.  
Discussion 
These results are consistent with our claim that an indirect effect of group entitativity 
on individual license is mediated by collective responsibility (H1). However, this 
correlational study does not allow causal inferences. Additionally, because individual and 
collective responsibility were measured on the same scale, their effects cannot be 
disentangled. The following studies address these issues by using experimental designs and 
directly measuring collective responsibility on a separate scale.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. We targeted 240 U.S.-based Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants, 
paid $.51 each (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). A sensitivity analysis conducted with 
G*Power indicated that this sample size in our within-subjects design provides 80% power at 
a = .05 to detect a mean difference of dz = .28 (Cohen, 1988; Faul et al., 2007). An a priori 
                                               
4 The model did not converge when we included a latent variable for each control variable, so 
we report results that only include latent variables for the mediator and dependent measure. 
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power analysis showed that the power to detect an indirect effect with modest correlations 
among variables (r = .25) and an SD of 1 exceeded 85% (Schoemann et al., 2017).5  
Participants could only access the study if they correctly answered a reading 
comprehension check, had a U.S. IP address, and were not on a mobile device. Of the 253 
people who accessed the study, 221 remained (109 men, 106 women, and 6 unknown gender; 
M age = 31.33 years, SD = 10.43) after a priori exclusions: providing insufficient data for 
analysis,6 or failing attention checks described below. There were no duplicate IP addresses 
or participant IDs. 
Materials and procedure.  
Manipulation. Participants read about a pair of fictional religions. Using an 
established manipulation (Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010), we 
described one religion as highly entitative (i.e., tightly structured with interdependent 
members) and one as less entitative (i.e., loosely structured with independent members). 
After completing the measures for the religious groups, participants read about a pair of 
fictional nations. To increase generalizability, we used a different entitativity manipulation 
(McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997), describing one nation’s members as similar in 
terms of background, opinions, beliefs, personalities, and behavior (high entitativity) and the 
other’s members as different on these dimensions (low entitativity). We counterbalanced 
which pair of groups participants saw first, and whether the entitative or non-entitative group 
was described first within each pair.  
Entitativity manipulation check. Participants rated each group’s entitativity using the 
established, six-item measure described in the Pilot Study (Denson et al., 2006).  
Mediator: collective responsibility. Participants read about a different member of 
                                               
5 Schoemann et al.’s methods produce power calculations for fully between-subjects designs. 
Because Experiment 1 uses a within-subjects design, its power is even higher than 85%.  
6 We considered data sufficient for analysis if a participant responded to all measures for at 
least one of the two pairs of groups, described subsequently. 
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each group who displayed the seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors against outgroups 
(see Pilot Study). For each act of prejudice, participants used a unipolar scale to rate how 
responsible other group members should feel for the individual’s behavior (Not at all, 
Slightly, Somewhat, A lot, Extremely, coded 1–5; as > .94 for each of the four groups; see 
Lickel et al., 2003).  
Dependent variable: license. As in the Pilot Study, we measured license by asking 
participants how acceptable it would be, according to the average study participant, for a 
member of each group to display each of the seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors (as 
> .93 for each group; Not at all, Slightly, Somewhat, Mostly, and Entirely coded 1-5). The 
mediator and dependent variable’s order was counterbalanced. 
Attention checks. We asked participants to identify which nation’s members were 
more similar, and which religion’s members were more interdependent. As noted, we 
excluded people who answered incorrectly. Finally, participants provided demographics.  
Results and Discussion 
The two different entitativity manipulations produced the same results. The 
manipulation check showed that the entitative national and religious groups were indeed 
perceived as more entitative than the less-entitative corresponding groups, ps < .0001 using 
paired-samples t-tests (see Table 1).  
We tested our main predictions in a multi-level mediation model to account for the 
fact that each participant rated two groups (see Pilot Study and Footnote 3). As predicted, 
collective responsibility perceptions significantly mediated a positive indirect effect of 
entitativity on license for both the national and the religious groups (see Figure 2), b = .16 
[.04, .28], z = 2.59, p = .01 and b = .22 [.08, .36], z = 3.08, p = .002, respectively. The total 
effect of entitativity on license (i.e., without specifying a mediation pathway) was also 
significant, p < .0001 (see Table 1).  
These results, in support of H1, suggest that entitativity increases how responsible 
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outsiders hold a group for a member’s prejudice, thereby increasing how socially acceptable 
people think their peers will find the member’s prejudice.  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 sought to replicate Experiment 1’s results and test whether the 
collective-responsibility mechanism is empirically distinct from a collective-interest 
mechanism. As in previous work, we expected membership in an entitative group to grant 
individuals greater license for prejudice in part because entitativity makes prejudice seem 
motivated by a desire to promote or defend the group’s interests (Effron & Knowles, 2015). 
Above and beyond this mechanism, we also expected entitativity to have a licensing effect by 
increasing attributions of responsibility to the group (H1).  
 Experiment 2 also sought to distinguish judgments of collective and individual 
responsibility. Our theorizing predicts a licensing effect mediated by collective responsibility 
above and beyond individual responsibility but is agnostic about whether individual 
responsibility will play any role. On one hand, entitativity could shift responsibility from the 
individual to the group (Mynatt & Sherman, 1975), which predicts that the licensing effect 
will be independently mediated by judgments of both individual and collective responsibility. 
On the other hand, entitativity could increase collective responsibility without decreasing 
individual responsibility (as in Waytz & Young, 2012), meaning that individual responsibility 
would not mediate the licensing effect. In that case, the group’s perceived role in causing the 
prejudice would make the individual’s prejudice appear less unacceptable (i.e., more 
licensed) without diminishing how responsible the individual seems for it (Darley & Shultz, 
1990; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). Thus, we did not formulate 
hypotheses about individual responsibility. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were American and Canadian users of Prolific Academic, 
an online research platform whose users are more diverse and naïve to research procedures 
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than MTurk users (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). As in Experiment 1, we 
posted slots for 240 people. As previously noted, a sensitivity analysis indicates that the 
smallest mean difference that this sample size can detect at 80% power and a = .05 is dz =.28, 
and the power to detect our hypothesized indirect effect exceeds 85%. Of the 244 people who 
began the study, 30 met our a priori exclusion criteria: 4 who provided insufficient data for 
analysis (see Footnote 6), 14 who failed the comprehension check described in Experiment 1, 
and 12 who had IP addresses outside the US and Canada. There were no duplicate IP 
addresses or participant IDs. The final sample size was thus 214. 
Materials and procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants read about a pair of 
religious groups that varied in entitativity (McConnell et al., 1997), completed the entitativity 
manipulation check (a > .83 for each group), and rated how responsible each group should 
feel if a member displayed each of seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors (as > .95). 
This time, they also rated how responsible the individual member should feel for displaying 
those preferences and behaviors (as > .95). The order of the individual and collective 
responsibility measures was counterbalanced.  
Next, participants completed a four-item measure of collective interests (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015), indicating their agreement on a 7-point scale with four reasons why the 
individual member might have felt and acted in the seven ways described earlier (e.g., he 
“thinks that other religious groups threaten his group’s interests”; Strongly disagree coded 1, 
Strongly agree coded 7; as > .82). Suggesting that collective interests and collective 
responsibility tapped different constructs, they were not highly correlated, rs < .26 for each 
group rated. 
Finally, participants responded to the individual license measure (as > .91) and 
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comprehension check described in Experiment 1.7 
Results 
The manipulation check showed that people perceived the high-entitativity group as 
more entitative than the low-entitativity group, p < .001 with a paired-samples t-test (see 
Table 2).  
Our central prediction was that entitativity would indirectly increase license through 
collective responsibility (H1), even when accounting for any indirect effects through 
collective interests and individual responsibility. To test this prediction, we constructed the 
parallel-mediation model shown in Figure 3 and tested it using a multilevel model with 
random intercepts for participant (see Pilot Study and Footnote 3). Supporting H1, there was 
a significantly positive indirect effect from entitativity to license via collective responsibility, 
b = .10 [.02, .18], z = 2.43, p = .015. Replicating previous research, there was also a 
significant indirect effect from entitativity to license via collective interests, b = .13 [.06, .19], 
z = 3.69, p < .001. The entitativity manipulation also had a significant total effect (i.e., 
without specifying a mediation pathway) on individual license p < .001 (see Table 2). Finally, 
an exploratory analysis revealed no evidence of an indirect effect through individual 
responsibility, b = .003 [-.006, .01], z = .70, p = .481.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 finds evidence of two independent reasons why individuals in high-
entitativity groups receive a license for prejudice: as in previous work, entitativity makes 
prejudice more attributable to a desire to defend or promote the group’s interests (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015), and consistent with our hypothesis, entitativity increases how responsible 
the group is held for the individual’s behavior.  
                                               
7 We also included an exploratory measure of how socially acceptable the average participant 
would think it was for all members of each group to display each of the prejudiced 
preferences and behaviors. For narrative clarity, we detail this measure and its results in the 
General Discussion. 
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Interestingly, entitativity did not significantly affect how responsible participants held 
the individual for prejudice. This finding is consistent with prior work showing that 
responsibility judgments are not always zero-sum (Tetlock, Self, & Singh, 2010; Waytz & 
Young, 2012), and clarifies why collective responsibility judgments drive the prejudice-
licensing effect of entitativity. Earlier, we suggested two possibilities—responsibility could 
“diffuse” from the prejudiced individual to other group members, lessening the individual’s 
prejudice (Mynatt & Sherman, 1975), or collective responsibility could act as a justification 
that lessens the rebuke an individual is seen as deserving without diminishing how causally 
responsible she is for her own behavior (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). The null effect on the 
individual responsibility measure is more consistent with the second possibility. 
A limitation of Experiments 1 and 2 is that the mediator and dependent variable’s 
causal order is ambiguous (Thoemmes, 2015). Experiment 3 addresses this ambiguity by 
directly manipulating collective responsibility (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Experiment 3 
also manipulated entitativity between subjects, providing a more conservative test than 
Experiment 1 and 2’s within-subjects design. 
Experiment 3 
Participants received information that implicated a group in one of its member’s 
prejudiced behaviors (high-collective-responsibility condition) or that exonerated the group 
(low-collective-responsibility condition), or they received no information about the group’s 
responsibility (control condition). We expected people to judge the individual as more 
licensed in the high- versus low-responsibility condition, with the control condition falling in 
between. 
 Orthogonally to this manipulation, Experiment 3 also manipulated entitativity. This 
design—a 2 (entitativity: high vs. low) X 3 (collective responsibility: high vs. low. vs. no 
information) factorial—provided an opportunity to replicate Experiment 1 and 2’s findings 
with between-subjects manipulations and examine theoretically-derived boundary conditions. 
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When no information about collective responsibility is provided, as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
we expected entitativity to increase collective responsibility attributions, which in turn would 
predict increased license––the indirect effect specified by H1. However, when collective 
responsibility is unambiguously high or low, entitativity is no longer an informative cue to 
collective responsibility. We thus predicted that in the two conditions that provided 
collective-responsibility information, the effect of collective responsibility on collective 
license would be weaker or absent (which should reduce H1’s indirect effect). Thus, the 
prejudice-licensing effect of entitativity via collective responsibility may only occur when 
collective responsibility is ambiguous.  
 The design also allowed us to test each link in the “causal-chain” approach to 
assessing mediation (Spencer et al., 2005). We tested whether manipulating the independent 
variable (entitativity) affects a measure of the proposed mediator (collective responsibility), 
and whether a manipulation of the mediator affects the dependent variable (individual 
license). Evidence for both possibilities would suggest collective responsibility plays a causal 
role in mediating an indirect effect of entitativity on license. 
Method 
 We preregistered the hypotheses, methods, and analyses, including sample size and 
exclusion criteria (see https://aspredicted.org/ee9ub.pdf or Online Supplement’s  Appendix 
9). 
Participants. We requested 1,000 complete responses from U.S.-based MTurk users, 
aiming for approximately 150 people in each of 6 cells in the final sample. A sensitivity 
analysis suggested the smallest effect size of the collective responsibility manipulation on 
license that this sample could detect with 80% power at a = .05 is f2 = .008 (two-tailed). An a 
priori power analysis using the method described in our previous studies (Schoemann et al., 
2017) showed that the experiment had > 99% power to detect the hypothesized indirect effect 
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with this sample size and a = .05, assuming a modest correlation among variables (rs = .25; 
SDs = 1).  
People were prevented from accessing the survey if they were on a mobile device, if 
they failed a reading comprehension question, or if they had participated in Experiment 2. 
After applying pre-registered exclusions (duplicate or non-US IP addresses, duplicate MTurk 
IDs, failed attention checks, insufficient data),8 973 remained (584 women, 385 men, and 4 
unknown gender; M age = 34.48, SD = 11.71). Data exclusions did not differ significantly 
between the two entitativity conditions, c2(1) = .01, p = .76, or among the three responsibility 
conditions, c2 (2) = .61, p = .74. 
Materials and procedure. Using one of Experiment 1’s manipulations (Crump et al., 
2010), we randomly assigned participants to read either a high- or a low-entitativity 
description of a fictional religious group (“the Ebbites”). Next, participants completed the 
entitativity scale from Studies 1 and 2 as a manipulation check (a  = .94). The attention check 
then asked them to identify whether the Ebbites was a religious, ethnic, or national group, or 
none of the above. Next, they read about Ed, an Ebbite who displays the prejudiced feelings 
and behaviors from Experiments 1 and 2. 
The collective responsibility manipulation closely followed a previous 
operationalization (Lickel et al., 2003; see also Pereira, Berent, Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, 
& Butera, 2015). Groups are collectively responsible for individual members’ wrongdoing 
when they are believed to have directly or indirectly encouraged the member’s behavior, and 
attributions of group encouragement rest on three fundamental elements: whether the group is 
aware of the wrongdoing, shares the wrongdoer’s feelings, and feels glad about the 
wrongdoing (Lickel et al., 2003; Lickel & Onuki, 2015). Thus, participants randomly 
assigned to the high-collective-responsibility condition read: 
                                               
8 We considered data insufficient if 25% of fewer scale items for any dependent measure 
(pre-registered). 
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The Ebbites who know Ed are completely aware of how he feels about members of 
other religious groups. In fact, they feel the same way about members of these groups. 
When they hear about how Ed acts towards members of these other groups, they feel 
glad. Indirectly or even directly, Ebbites encourage Ed to act in these ways. 
 
Those in the low-responsibility condition instead read: 
The Ebbites who know Ed are not at all aware of how he feels about members of 
other religious groups. In fact, the way they feel about members of these groups is the 
opposite of how Ed feels. If they heard about how Ed acts towards members of these 
other groups, they would feel appalled. Ebbites never encourage Ed to act in these 
ways, neither directly nor even indirectly. 
 
Those randomly assigned to the control condition did not read either passage.  
Participants then completed Experiment 2’s collective responsibility and license 
measures (as = .97 and .95, respectively). For the license measure, we clarified:  
We are not interested in how acceptable you personally think it is to perform these 
behaviors. We are not interested in your judgments of how acceptable Ebbites think 
it is to perform these behaviors. Instead, we are interested in your judgments of how 
acceptable the average participant in this study thinks it is for a member of the 
Ebbites to perform these behaviors. 
 
Results 
 We report all pre-registered analyses, and flag non-pre-registered tests as exploratory. 
For narrative clarity, we describe the results in a different order than in the pre-registration 
document. We pre-registered one-tailed tests, but report (more-conservative) two-tailed tests 
because they produced identical conclusions. 
Manipulation checks. The entitativity manipulation increased entitativity perceptions 
(Mhigh-ent = 6.20, SD = .78; Mlow-ent = 3.46, SD = 1.07), t(971) = 45.77, p < .001. People 
attributed greater responsibility to the group in the high-responsibility condition (M = 3.58, 
SD = 1.13) than in the low-responsibility condition (M = 2.32, SD = 1.23), with the control 
condition falling in between (M = 3.06, SD = 1.25). A linear contrast for the collective 
responsibility conditions (low = –1, control = 0, high = +1) in a regression controlling for 
entitativity condition (–1 = low, +1 = high) showed this pattern was significant, b = .63, 
t(970) = 13.50, p < .001. In further support of this linear pattern, an (exploratory) orthogonal 
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contrast comparing the control (–2) to the other two conditions (each coded +1) was not 
significant when added to the model, b = -.04, t(969) = 1.29, p = .198. 
 Effect of responsibility manipulation on license. Supporting our claim that 
collective responsibility has a causal effect on license, people perceived the group member as 
more licensed to express prejudice in the high-collective-responsibility condition (M = 2.37, 
SD = 1.23) than in the low-collective-responsibility condition (M = 2.01, SD = .93), with the 
control condition falling in between (M = 2.24, SD = 1.07). Regressing license on the linear 
contrasts described above shows this ordering of means was significant, b = .18, t(970) = 
4.20, p < .001, f2 = .018. Further supporting the linear pattern, an (exploratory) orthogonal 
contrast comparing the control condition to the other two conditions was not significant when 
added to the model, b = -.02, t(969) = .64, p = .525. 
 Indirect effect of entitativity on license through collective responsibility. When 
participants received no information about collective responsibility (control condition), we 
replicated Experiment 1 and 2’s effects in a between-subjects design, as predicted: The 
entitativity manipulation increased perceptions of collective responsibility, which in turn 
predicted greater perceptions of individual license (see Figure 4, top panel)—a significant 
indirect effect, b = .08 [.02, .18] for the 95% CI, bias-corrected and bootstrapped with 5,000 
resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This analysis dummy-coded entitativity (high = 1, low 
= 0) and mean-centered collective-responsibility perceptions. 
 By contrast, exploratory tests found no evidence that entitativity indirectly affected 
license when participants received unambiguous information about collective responsibility, 
bs = .02 [-.003, .08] in the low-responsibility condition, and .02 [-.006, .06] in the high-
responsibility condition (see Figure 4, middle and bottom panels). In fact, an exploratory 
moderated mediation analysis showed that the indirect effect of entitativity through collective 
responsibility on license was significantly smaller in these conditions than in the control 
condition (see Online Supplement, Appendix 1). This finding fits with our reasoning that 
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entitativity would only be an informative cue for collective responsibility judgments in the 
absence of clear information about who was responsible.  
In further support of this reasoning, and consistent with a pre-registered prediction, 
the entitativity manipulation increased collective responsibility perceptions to a larger extent 
when collective responsibility was ambiguous (control condition: Cohen’s d = .58) than when 
it was unambiguously high (d = .16) or unambiguously low (d = .13; see Table 3 for Ms and 
SDs). A regression analysis confirmed this pattern with a significant, negative interaction 
between the entitativity manipulation (effect-coded) and a contrast comparing the high- and 
the low-responsibility conditions (each coded +1) to the control condition (coded –2), b = -
.09, t(967) = 3.24, p = .001. (The regression also included an orthogonal comparing the low- 
and high-responsibility conditions to each other, +1 vs. –1, plus its interaction with 
entitativity, but we had no predictions about these contrasts).9 These results suggest an 
important boundary condition for our effect: Entitativity only licenses prejudice by increasing 
collective responsibility perceptions when responsibility is ambiguous.  
Neither the entitativity manipulation nor its interaction with the collective 
responsibility manipulation had a significant total effect on license, unexpectedly (see Online 
Supplement, Appendix 1). This result contrasts with Experiments 1 and 2, perhaps because 
the previous experiments’ within-subjects designs (unlike Experiment 3’s between-subjects 
design) could account for error variance due to individual differences (see Ellsworth, 
Aronson, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990). Nonetheless, theoretically meaningful indirect 
effects can emerge even in the absence of statistically significant total effects (e.g., Rucker, 
Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Thus, the indirect effect 
                                               
9 Simple slopes analysis confirmed our prediction that the entitativity manipulation would 
significantly increase collective responsibility in the control condition, b = .35, t(967) = 5.24, 
p < .001. We had no predictions about whether the same effect would be significant in the 
high- and low-collective responsibility conditions. Exploratory analysis showed that when 
these conditions were averaged, entitativity increased collective responsibility perceptions to 
a marginally significant extent, b = .09, t(967) = 1.86, p = .063. 
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observed in Experiment 3 provides strong support for our hypothesized process, that 
entitativity increases collective responsibility, which increases individual license. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 confirms collective responsibility judgments as a causal mechanism 
linking entitativity perceptions and prejudice-licensing. Its fully between-subjects 
experimental design produced three key findings: (a) replicating Experiments 1 and 2, and 
supporting H1, entitative groups were held more responsible for a member’s prejudice, which 
led participants to expect their own peers to judge the member’s behavior as less 
unacceptable, (b) establishing a boundary condition, this effect only occurred when the 
group’s responsibility was ambiguous, and (c) demonstrating a causal link from collective 
responsibility to license, a manipulation of how much the group influenced the member’s 
prejudice affected how unacceptable participants thought their peers would find this 
prejudice.  
Follow-Up to Experiment 3 
We conducted a follow-up study to test the robustness of the causal link from 
collective responsibility to license (N = 590 MTurk participants; see Online Supplement’s 
Appendix 2 for full methods and results). As noted, Experiment 3’s collective responsibility 
manipulation varied the three fundamental elements theorized to underlie the belief that a 
group has facilitated member wrongdoing (Lickel et al., 2003; Lickel & Onuki, 2015). The 
follow-up study instead adopted a different manipulation to directly affect collective 
responsibility without mentioning these three elements (Pereira et al., 2015, Study 4). 
Participants in the high (vs. low) responsibility condition were told that a neutral community 
leader held a religious group responsible (vs. not responsible) for a member’s prejudiced 
behavior after learning they had (vs. had not) facilitated and encouraged it. The results 
showed that participants afforded the group member greater license in the high-responsibility 
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condition than in the low-responsibility condition, thus providing additional evidence of the 
causal link between collective responsibility and individual license. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 tested whether our central findings would be robust to a different 
measure of license. As noted, psychological license is defined as a judgment that a person can 
legitimately do or say something that would normally discredit them (Miller & Effron, 2010). 
As in Experiments 1-3, previous work on entitativity and prejudice assessed license by asking 
participants to rate how socially acceptable a target behavior is (Effron & Knowles, 2015). 
Other research focuses more specifically on the moral aspects of license by assessing the 
extent to which prejudiced actions and other questionable behaviors escape moral 
condemnation (Effron & Monin, 2010). Following this latter approach, Experiment 4’s 
dependent measure was moral condemnation. 
Experiment 4 also investigated whether entitativity affects the license afforded to the 
group as a whole for a member’s prejudice. We predicted that when a member expresses 
prejudice, entitativity would increase collective responsibility (as in our previous 
experiments), which would lead to increased moral condemnation of the group (i.e., less 
collective license; H2), even while it leads to decreased moral condemnation of the individual 
(i.e., greater individual license; H1). This finding would support our general claim that when 
a group member transgresses, entitativity can harm the group while benefitting the individual.     
Method 
 We preregistered the hypotheses, methods, and analyses, including sample size and 
exclusion criteria (see https://aspredicted.org/me8xi.pdf or Online Supplement’s Appendix 
10). 
 Participants. Experiment 4 had the same design as Experiments 1 and 2, so we 
posted slots for the same number of American and Canadian participants (240) on Prolific 
Academic (see Experiments 1 and 2 for sensitivity and power analyses). Of the 257 people 
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who began the study, we dropped 2 for submitting data from a duplicate IP address, 7 for 
having an IP address outside the US or Canada, 13 who skipped at least 25% of the items for 
any dependent measure or mediator, and 15 who failed a comprehension check. There were 
no duplicate participant IDs. The final sample size was 220 (110 men, 106 women, 4 
nonbinary; M age = 35.63, SD = 12.88). 
 Materials and procedure. The procedure closely followed Experiment 2 and used 
the same entitativity manipulation. Participants read about two fictional religious groups—
one high in entitativity, and one low in entitativity. After completing the entitativity 
manipulation check (a > .81 for each group), they rated each group’s collective responsibility 
for each of seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors by a group member (as > .95; see 
Experiment 1), and completed nine moral condemnation items from previous research 
(Effron, Lucas, & O'Connor, 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010). Specifically, participants rated 
each group on the following semantic differentials, displayed in randomized order, and 
averaged with starred items reverse-coded so higher numbers indicate greater condemnation: 
cruel/kind*, nice/awful, cold/warm*, honest/dishonest, unfair/fair*, arrogant/humble*, 
good/bad, and likeable/dislikeable (as > .95). Using the same measures, participants also 
provided responsibility and moral condemnation ratings for the prejudiced individual in each 
group (as > .96 and .95, respectively). The order in which participants rated the individual 
versus the group was randomized. 
Results and Discussion 
The manipulation check confirmed that people viewed the high-entitativity group as 
more entitative than the low-entitativity group, p < .001 in a paired-samples t-test (see Table 
4).  
 We tested our predictions with multi-level mediation models that used latent variables 
to model random intercepts for participants (see Pilot Study and Footnote 3). First, we 
computed a model with the entitativity manipulation as the independent variable (IV), 
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collective and individual responsibility as two parallel mediator variables (MVs), and 
individual moral condemnation as the dependent variable (DV; see Figure 5, top panel).10 
Consistent with the results of our previous experiments and H1, we found evidence that 
entitativity provided individuals a license for prejudice by increasing collective 
responsibility. That is, we observed a significant, negative indirect effect from entitativity to 
collective responsibility to individual condemnation, b = -.13 [-.25, -.003], z = 2.02, p = .044. 
An exploratory analysis showed no evidence of an indirect effect through individual 
responsibility, as in Experiment 2, b = -.003 [-.03, .03], z = .22, p = .82. These findings 
suggest the results of our previous studies generalize to a different operationalization of 
license. A supplementary analysis (not pre-registered) showed no significant total effect of 
the entitativity manipulation on individual condemnation, p = .823 (see Table 4). Perhaps 
participants were reluctant to appear as though they were condoning prejudice by reducing 
their moral condemnation of the prejudiced individual.   
Next, we ran the same model with collective moral condemnation as the DV (see 
Figure 5, bottom panel). Going beyond our previous studies, and as H2 predicts, we found 
evidence that entitativity deprived groups of a license for a member’s prejudice by increasing 
their apparent collective responsibility. That is, there was a significant positive indirect effect 
from entitativity to collective responsibility to collective moral condemnation, b = .17 [.05, 
.30], z = 2.89, p = .004. Again, an exploratory analysis found no evidence of an indirect effect 
through individual responsibility, b = .0005 [-.004, .005], z = .21, p = .830. A supplementary 
analysis (not pre-registered) showed a significant total effect of the entitativity manipulation 
on collective condemnation, p = .016 (see Table 4). These results show that, through 
                                               
10 We first modelled moral condemnation to the group and to the individual as dependent 
variables (DVs) in the same model, but the model did not converge after 100 iterations, so we 
followed our pre-registered contingency plan of computing separate models for each DV. 
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increasing attributions of collective responsibility when an individual expresses prejudice, 
entitativity can be a benefit for the individual but a liability to the group. 
General Discussion 
 The present studies reveal that when an individual expresses prejudice, the entitativity 
of his or her group—the extent to which it is closely-knit—has divergent effects on how 
outside observers judge the individual versus the group. Mediational and experimental data 
from a pilot, four experiments, and a follow-up study (N = 2,455) support two hypotheses: 
group entitativity increases how collectively responsible the group is held for the member’s 
prejudice, which in turn increases the license observers afford to the individual (H1) but also 
predicts a decrease in the license they afford to the group for the individual’s behavior (H2). 
The well-powered studies and pre-registered analyses afford considerable confidence in the 
robustness of these results.  
Theoretical Contributions  
These results offer several theoretical contributions. First, they address a central issue 
in the literature on group perceptions: when and how the appearance of entitativity will 
benefit versus harm the public image of a group and its members (Castano et al., 2003; Dang 
et al., in press; Dasgupta et al., 1999; Newheiser et al., 2012; Newheiser & Dovidio, 2015). 
Specifically, the results resolve a tension between work on collective responsibility, which 
suggests that entitativity is a liability when group members transgress (e.g., Lickel et al., 
2001), and work on prejudice-licensing, which suggests entitativity is a benefit when group 
members express prejudice (Effron & Knowles, 2015). Our results integrate both 
perspectives in a single model. We find that when a member expresses prejudice, entitativity 
can be a liability for the group, in that it increases how responsible observers hold the group 
(Pilot Study, Experiments 1-4), which in turn attracts moral condemnation to the group 
(Experiment 4). However, entitativity’s effect on collective responsibility benefits the 
prejudiced individual by leading people to perceive his or her behavior as less socially 
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unacceptable to people outside the group (Pilot Study, Experiments 1-3), and by lowering the 
moral condemnation the individual attracts (Experiment 4). In this way, our studies show that 
entitativity can have divergent consequences on judgments of an individual versus his or her 
group.  
 Second, our results offer a novel mechanism explaining entitativity’s prejudice-
licensing effect. Previous work assumed that entitativity licenses prejudice by making it seem 
motivated by legitimate, rationalistic concerns about protecting ingroup interests (Effron & 
Knowles, 2015). In this view, observers construe the same prejudiced act less negatively 
when committed by a more-entitative group. By contrast, the present work reveals that 
entitativity can also license individual prejudice by making the group seem responsible for 
the individual’s behavior. A potential implication of this view is that group entitativity could 
make individuals seem more licensed to enact prejudice without changing how negatively 
observers judge the prejudiced act itself. Though the collective-responsibility and collective-
interest mechanisms are conceptually and empirically distinct, they may often work in 
tandem as they did in Experiment 2. 
Finally, our results provide new evidence of how entitativity can exacerbate 
intergroup conflict. Whereas much work shows that viewing a group as entitative can stoke 
stereotyping and prejudice (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018; Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Er-rafiy 
& Brauer, 2013; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007), the present work shows it 
can license individual members of that group to express prejudice against others.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Prior work distinguishes between collective responsibility by omission (e.g., the 
group did nothing to prevent an individual’s wrongdoing) versus commission (e.g., the group 
encouraged the wrongdoing; see Lickel et al., 2003). Our collective responsibility 
manipulation in Experiment 3 and its follow-up focuses on responsibility by commission. 
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Future work could investigate whether commission or omission is more relevant to 
entitativity’s prejudice-licensing effect.  
The license measure in Experiments 1-3 clearly asked participants to estimate how 
one of their own peers (the average person in the study) would judge an individual’s 
prejudice. Participants and their peers were generally not members of this individual’s group. 
Thus, our studies show that the appearance of entitativity can increase perceptions that the 
broader community outside the group finds a member’s prejudice less unacceptable. 
However, it would be interesting to see whether these results generalize to judgments of 
ingroups. Our Pilot Study, in which some participants judged religious groups in which they 
held membership, found no evidence that the effect of entitativity depended on whether 
participants judged an ingroup or outgroup, but we urge caution in interpreting this null result 
because the sample of ingroup ratings was small.  
Future work could also examine whether people are more likely to blame their own 
prejudices on the group when they perceive their groups as highly entitative. If so, it could 
explain why membership in an entitative group seems to make people more comfortable 
expressing prejudice (Effron & Knowles, 2015) or otherwise favoring their ingroup at 
outgroups’ expense (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Insko, Wildschut, & Cohen, 2013). Finally, 
future research should examine whether entitativity can license wrongdoings other than the 
expression of prejudice. We suspect it would because entitativity increases perceptions of 
collective responsibility for a variety of wrongdoings (e.g., Denson et al., 2006). 
Can Entitativity License an Entire Group to Express Prejudice? 
  The purpose of our research was to explain how and why entitativity affects 
observers’ judgments of (a) an individual who express prejudice and (b) a larger group to 
which he or she belongs. We did not formulate hypotheses about how participants would 
judge a group in which they observed all members expressing prejudice, because it is unclear 
how our collective responsibility mechanism would operate in this context. If the entire group 
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enacts prejudice, the group may already be seen as unambiguously responsible for the 
prejudice, so entitativity may have little effect on collective responsibility, and thus on 
license. However, entitativity could still provide some license for prejudice in such contexts 
by making it seem motivated by collective interests. 
A thorough investigation of this question is beyond the present research’s scope, but 
Experiment 2 did include an exploratory measure of license for an entire group to express 
prejudice (see Footnote 7). Specifically, we asked participants to rate how socially acceptable 
it would be for all members of an entitative and non-entitative group to display each of the 
seven prejudiced preferences and behaviors from our other studies (a = .97). The results 
revealed that participants thought prejudice was more socially acceptable for all the members 
of an entitative group to express (M = 2.18, SD = 1.02) than for all the members of a non-
entitative group to express (M = 2.03, SD = .88), paired t(214) = 3.30, p = .001. Thus, 
entitativity increased the license afforded to all group members to commit prejudice, much 
like it increased the license afforded to one group member to commit prejudice. As noted, 
this finding seems better explained by the collective-interest mechanism (Experiment 2; also 
Effron & Knowles, 2015) than the collective-responsibility mechanism. 
Implications and Conclusion 
We live in an era where an individual’s expressions of prejudice, amplified by social 
media, often attracts a great deal of public attention. As Rosanne Barr’s experience 
illustrates, the fallout can extend beyond the individual who has actually expressed the 
prejudice to a group in which the individual holds membership. The present research reveals 
one psychological factor––entitativity––that affects who bears the brunt of this fallout. When 
outsiders perceive the group as highly entitative, they may be more inclined to let the 
individual off the hook for prejudice while condemning the group, in part because they hold 
the group collective responsible. 
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Open Practices 
 Verbatim materials for all studies can be accessed in the Online Supplement. The pre-
registration files for Experiments 3 and 4 are available at, respectively, 
https://aspredicted.org/ee9ub.pdf and https://aspredicted.org/me8xi.pdf 
  
  
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  33 
References 
 
Abelson, R. P., Dasgupta, N., Park, J., & Banaji, M. R. (1998). Perceptions of the collective 
other. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2(4), 243.  
Abelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. D., & Fiske, S. T. (1982). Affective and semantic 
components in political person perception. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 42(4), 619.  
Agadullina, E. R., & Lovakov, A. V. (2018). Are people more prejudiced towards groups that 
are perceived as coherent? A meta-analysis of the relationship between out-group 
entitativity and prejudice. British Journal of Social Psychology.  
Brewer, M. B., & Harasty, A. S. (1996). Seeing groups as entities: The role of perceiver 
motivation. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and 
cognition, Vol. 3: The interpersonal context (pp. 347-370). New York: Guilford Press. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of 
aggregates of person as social entitites. Behavioral Sciences, 3, 14-25.  
Castano, E., Sacchi, S., & Gries, P. H. (2003). The perception of the other in international 
relations: Evidence for the polarizing effect of entitativity. Political Psychology, 
24(3), 449-468.  
Chow, A. R. (2018, May 29). Twitter users respond to Roseanne Barr’s firing, The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/arts/television/reactions-
roseanne-racist-tweet.html 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Hilsdale, NJ: 
Earlbaum. 
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  34 
Crump, S. A., Hamilton, D. L., Sherman, S. J., Lickel, B., & Thakkar, V. (2010). Group 
entitativity and similarity: Their differing patterns in perceptions of groups. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 40(7), 1212-1230. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.716 
Dang, J., Liu, L., Ren, D., & Gu, Z. (in press). “Groupy” allies are more beneficial while 
“groupy” enemies are more harmful. Social Psychological and Personality Science.  
Darley, J. M., & Latané, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of 
responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8(4), 377-383.  
Darley, J. M., & Shultz, T. R. (1990). Moral rules: Their content and acquisition. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 41(1), 525-556.  
Dasgupta, N., Banaji, M. R., & Abelson, R. P. (1999). Group entitativity and group 
perception: Associations between physical features and psychological judgment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 991-1003. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.77.5.991 
Denson, T. F., Lickel, B., Curtis, M., Stenstrom, D. M., & Ames, D. R. (2006). The roles of 
entitativity and essentiality in judgments of collective responsibility. Group Processes 
& Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 43-61.  
Effron, D. A., & Knowles, E. D. (2015). Entitativity and intergroup bias: How belonging to a 
cohesive group allows people to express their prejudices. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 108(2), 234-253. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000020 
Effron, D. A., Lucas, B. J., & O'Connor, K. (2015). Hypocrisy by association: When 
organizational membership increases condemnation for wrongdoing. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 130, 147-159. doi: 
10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.05.001 
Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Letting people off the hook: When do good deeds excuse 
transgressions? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1618-1634. doi: 
10.1177/0146167210385922 
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  35 
Ellsworth, P. C., Aronson, E., Carlsmith, J. M., & Gonzales, M. H. (1990). Methods of 
research in social psychology: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. 
Er-rafiy, A., & Brauer, M. (2013). Modifying perceived variability: Four laboratory and field 
experiments show the effectiveness of a ready-to-be-used prejudice intervention. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(4), 840-853.  
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175-191.  
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske 
& D. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 357-411). 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Flood, B. (2018). MSNBC star Chris Hayes says 'significant chunk' of Trump voters are 
racists like Roseanne Barr, Fox News. Retrieved from 
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2018/05/30/msnbc-star-chris-hayes-says-
significant-chunk-trump-voters-are-racists-like-roseanne-barr.html 
Gaertner, L., Iuzzini, J., & O’Mara, E. M. (2008). When rejection by one fosters aggression 
against many: Multiple-victim aggression as a consequence of social rejection and 
perceived groupness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 958-970.  
Gaertner, L., & Schopler, J. (1998). Perceived ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias: An 
interconnection of self and others. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28(6), 
963-980. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(1998110)28:6<963::AID-
EJSP905>3.0.CO;2-S 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132(5), 692.  
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  36 
Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (1996). Perceiving persons and groups. Psychological 
Review, 103(2), 336-355. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.103.2.336 
Hornsey, M. J., Oppes, T., & Svensson, A. (2002). "It's ok if we say it, but you can't": 
Responses to intergroup and intragroup criticism. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 32(3), 293-307.  
Insko, C. A., Wildschut, T., & Cohen, T. R. (2013). Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
in the prisoner's dilemma game: How common fate, proximity, and similarity affect 
intergroup competition. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
120(2), 168-180. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.004 
Lickel, B., Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (2001). Elements of a lay theory of groups: 
Types of groups, relational styles, and the perception of group entitativity. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 5(2), 129-140. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0502_4 
Lickel, B., Miller, N., Stenstrom, D. M., Denson, T. F., & Schmader, T. (2006). Vicarious 
retribution: The role of collective blame in intergroup aggression. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 10(4), 372-390. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_6 
Lickel, B., & Onuki, M. (2015). Generalization processes in collective responsibility and 
intergroup conflict. In S. J. Stroessner & J. W. Sherman (Eds.), Social perception 
from individuals to groups (pp. 197-212). New York: Psychology Press. 
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., & Hamilton, D. L. (2003). A case of collective responsibility: Who 
else was to blame for the Columbine High School shootings? Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 29(2), 194-204. doi: 10.1177/0146167202239045 
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., O'Laughlin, M. J., Pearce, G. E., & Nelson, S. E. (2000). Conceptual 
structure and social functions of behavior explanations: beyond person--situation 
attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(3), 309-326.  
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  37 
McConnell, A. R., Sherman, S. J., & Hamilton, D. L. (1997). Target entitativity: Implications 
for information processing about individual and group targets. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 72(4), 750-762. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.750 
Miller, D. T., & Effron, D. A. (2010). Psychological license: When it is needed and how it 
functions. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 43, pp. 117-158). San Diego, CA: Academic Press/Elsevier. 
Mynatt, C., & Sherman, S. J. (1975). Responsibility attribution in groups and individuals: A 
direct test of the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 32(6), 1111-1118.  
Newheiser, A.-K., & Dovidio, J. F. (2015). High outgroup entitativity can inhibit intergroup 
retribution. British Journal of Social Psychology, 54(2), 341-358. doi: 
10.1111/bjso.12078 
Newheiser, A.-K., Sawaoka, T., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). Why do we punish groups? High 
entitativity promotes moral suspicion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
48(4), 931-936.  
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation 
checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45, 867-872  
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017). Beyond the Turk: Alternative 
platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 70, 153-163.  
Pereira, A., Berent, J., Falomir-Pichastor, J. M., Staerklé, C., & Butera, F. (2015). Collective 
punishment depends on collective responsibility and political organization of the 
target group. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 56, 4-17.  
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  38 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing 
and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research 
Methods, 40(3), 879-891.  
Rucker, D. D., Preacher, K. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Petty, R. E. (2011). Mediation analysis in 
social psychology: Current practices and new recommendations. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 5(6), 359-371. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2011.00355.x 
Schoemann, A. M., Boulton, A. J., & Short, S. D. (2017). Determining power and sample 
size for simple and complex mediation models. Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 8(4), 379-386.  
Shaver, K. G. (1985). The attribution of blame. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Shaw, J. C., Wild, E., & Colquitt, J. A. (2003). To justify or excuse?: A meta-analytic review 
of the effects of explanations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(3), 444.  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2012). A 21 Word Solution. Dialogue: The 
Official Newsletter of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 26(2), 4-7.  
Sjöstström, A., & Gollwitzer, M. (2015). Displaced revenge: Can revenge taste “sweet” if it 
aims at a different target? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 56(191-202).  
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why 
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining 
psychological processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 845.  
Spencer-Rodgers, J., Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (2007). The central role of entitativity 
in stereotypes of social categories and task groups. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(3), 369-388. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.3.369 
Stenstrom, D. M., Lickel, B., Denson, T. F., & Miller, N. (2008). The roles of ingroup 
identification and outgroup entitativity in intergroup retribution. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(11), 1570-1582. doi: 10.1177/0146167208322999 
ENTITATIVITY AND PREJUDICE  39 
Tedeschi, J. T., & Reiss, M. (1981). Verbal strategies in impression management. In C. 
Antaki (Ed.), The psychology of ordinary explanations of social behaviour. London: 
Academic Press. 
Tetlock, P. E., Self, W. T., & Singh, R. (2010). The punitiveness paradox: When is external 
pressure exculpatory – and when a signal just to spread blame? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 388-395. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.11.013 
Thai, M., Hornsey, M. J., & Barlow, F. K. (2016). Friends with moral credentials: Minority 
friendships reduce attributions of racism for majority group members who make 
conceivably racist statements. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(3), 
272-280.  
Thoemmes, F. (2015). Reversing arrows in mediation models does not distinguish plausible 
models. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 37(4), 226-234.  
Waytz, A., & Young, L. (2012). The group-member mind trade-off: Attributing mind to 
groups versus group members. Psychological Science, 24(10), 1089-1103. doi: 
10.1177/0956797611423546 
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct. 
New York: Guilford. 
Zhao, X., Lynch, J. G., & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and 
truths about mediation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(2), 197-206.  
  
Tables 
 
Table 1 
 
Experiment 1’s Results for Each Measure and Group Type  
 
    National Groups   Religious Groups 
Measure   
High 
Entitativity 
Low 
Entitativity t dz   
High 
Entitativity 
Low 
Entitativity t dz 
Entitativity M 5.92 3.51 24.69*** 1.67  6.28 3.28 34.43*** 2.32 
 (SD) (0.85) (1.01)    (0.72) (1.07)   
 n 218 218    220 220   
Collective 
responsibility 
M 3.34 2.04 11.93*** .81  3.52 2.13 16.45*** 1.11 
(SD) (1.16) (1.01)    (1.05) (0.91)   
 n 217 217    219 219   
License M 3.05 2.14 8.88*** .60  2.87 2.36 6.00*** .41 
 (SD) (1.18) (0.96)    (1.17) (0.98)   
 n 217 217    220 220   
                    
 Notes. df for paired-sample ts range from 216 to 219 due to missing data. We 
calculated effect size dz as per Cohen (1988). *** p < .0001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Experiment 2’s Results for Each Measure and Group Type  
 
 
Measure     
High 
Entitativity 
Low 
Entitativity t dz 
Entitativitya M  6.21 3.44 31.90*** 2.18 
 (SD)  (0.66) (1.11)   
 n  214 214   
Collective 
responsibilityb 
M  3.14 2.15 12.77*** .87 
(SD)  (1.17) (1.00)   
 n  214 214   
Collective 
interestsa 
M  4.94 3.92 9.21*** .63 
(SD)  (1.35) (1.38)   
 n  214 214   
Individual 
responsibilityb 
M  3.82 3.77 0.82 .06 
(SD)  (1.10) (1.16)   
 n  214 214   
Individual 
licenseb 
M  2.34 2.11 3.82*** .26 
(SD)  (1.04) (.90)   
 n  214 214   
                   
Note. df for paired t-tests = 213. We calculated effect size dz as per Cohen (1988). 
*** p < .001. a 7-point scale. b 5-point scale 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Collective Responsibility Measure in Each Condition of Experiment 
3 
 
  
Low 
Responsibility 
High 
Responsibility Control 
Low 
Entitativity 
Mean 2.24 3.49 2.70 
SD 1.26 1.14 1.29 
n 161 168 154 
High 
Entitativity 
Mean 2.40 3.67 3.40 
SD 1.19 1.13 1.11 
n 161 164 165 
 
Note. Collective responsibility was measured on a 5-point scale. 
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Table 4 
 
Experiment 4’s Results for Each Measure and Group Type  
 
 
Measure     
High 
Entitativity 
Low 
Entitativity t dz 
Entitativitya M  6.24 3.40 35.90*** 2.42 
 (SD)  (0.64) (.95)   
       
Collective 
responsibilityb 
M  3.27 2.10 16.32*** 1.10 
(SD)  (1.14) (.94)   
       
Individual 
responsibilityb 
M  4.02 4.03 0.23 .02 
(SD)  (1.02) (1.11)   
       
Collective 
condemnationa 
M  4.05 3.85 2.43* .16 
(SD)  (1.15) (.92)   
       
Individual 
condemnationa 
M  4.81 4.83 .27 .02 
(SD)  (1.30) (1.25)   
       
                   
Notes. df for paired t-tests = 219. We calculated effect size dz as per Cohen (1988). 
*p < .05 ***p < .001. a  7-point scale. b 5-point scale 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Indirect Effect of Entitativity Through Collective Responsibility on Individual License in Pilot 
Study 
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Results shown are for the analysis without 
covariates. 
  
β = .14, b = 2.90 *** 
Entitativity 
(measured) 
Direct Effect:  
β = .06, b = .05 
Indirect (mediated) effect: 
b = .02 [.008, .038] ** 
Collective 
responsibility 
Individual 
license 
β = .20, b =.008*** 
Collective vs. 
individual
responsibility .008 ***
.05
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Figure 2 
Indirect Effect of Entitativity Through Collective Responsibility on Individual License in 
Experiment 1. Top panel: national groups. Bottom panel: religious groups. 
 
 
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
1.30 ***
Entitativity
(0 = low
1 = high)
Direct Effect: 
.76 **
Indirect (Mediated) Effect:
b = .16 [.039, .283] *
Collective 
responsibility
Individual
license
.12 **
1.39 ***
Entitativity
(0 = low
1 = high)
Direct Effect: 
.29 **
Indirect (mediated) effect:
b = .22 [.080, .361] **
Collective 
responsibility
Individual
license
.16 **
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Figure 3 
 
Indirect Effect of Entitativity Through Collective Responsibility, Individual Responsibility 
and Collective Interests on Individual License in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Solid lines are significant paths. Values are 
unstandardized path coefficients.  
Collective 
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Figure 4: Indirect Effect of Entitativity Through Collective Responsibility on Individual 
License in Experiment 3. Top panel: no-information (control) condition. Middle panel: low-
responsibility condition. Bottom panel: high-responsibility condition. 
  
  
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Solid lines are significant paths. Values are unstandardized path coefficients.  
.69 ***
Entitativity
(-1 = low
+1 = high)
Direct Effect: 
-.06
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Figure 5 
Indirect Effect of Entitativity Through Collective Responsibility and Individual Responsibility 
on Individual (Top Panel) and Collective Condemnation (Bottom Panel) in Experiment 4.  
 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Solid lines are significant paths. Values are 
unstandardized path coefficients. 
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